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ABSTRACT
The Portuguese Expeditionary Corps [C.E.P.] was the centrepiece of 
Portugal’s intervention in the First World War. It was despatched to 
France in order to secure international plaudits for Portugal and its 
young republican regime, in place since October 1910. This political 
objective required the C.E.P. to be as independent a force as possible. 
Unfortunately, the C.E.P. failed to impress its senior partner, the British 
Army, whose High Command soon lost faith in it, applying pressure to 
the British Government either to remove the C.E.P. altogether or to limit, 
as far as possible, the Portuguese presence in the trenches. Despite 
this, in November of 1917 a ‘Portuguese Sector’ was constituted in 
Flanders, with the two Portuguese divisions fighting side by side. 
This article investigates the nature of the misgivings between the 
two armies and considers why, in such a charged atmosphere, the 
British High Command was forced to give way.
On 8 September 1917 Lord Derby, British Secretary of State for War, wrote to his Portuguese 
counterpart, José Maria Norton de Matos. Winter was approaching, he reminded Norton 
de Matos, as a result of which Sir Douglas Haig was increasingly concerned about the 
Portuguese troops under his command, who would soon number two complete infantry 
divisions and supporting forces. Needless casualties, it was predicted, would result from 
their prolonged permanence in the trenches. Haig had thus proposed that one Portuguese 
division remained – as it had been for some time – a part of a British army corps, under the 
tactical authority of the corps commander, while the other served as a reserve and training 
force, its units periodically replacing those of the combat division. General Tamagnini de 
Abreu, the commander of the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps [Corpo Expedicionário 
Português, C.E.P.], would stay on in France as an Inspector General of the force. Derby then 
had recourse to a historical precedent in order to justify his next suggestion, more difficult to 
swallow. During the Peninsular War British officers had served in the Portuguese army, ‘to 
the great advantage of both countries’. Derby suggested reinstating this practice, inserting a 
number of British officers into each Portuguese battalion or similarly sized unit; they could 
keep an eye on the troops’ instruction when not in the trenches, and, if necessary, assume 
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command in battle. The practical details could be worked out later; all that was needed now 
was a broad agreement.1
Upon receiving the letter, a shocked Norton de Matos immediately consulted with 
General N.W. Barnardiston, who for over a year had been serving as the head of the British 
Military Mission in Lisbon. The Minister inquired if there were any hidden motives for 
Derby’s letter, which had arrived out of the blue. Barnardiston replied that he did not know 
of any, adding that a unit so weakened by illness could not be expected to repulse a German 
attack and that Derby’s plan was a way of guaranteeing the presence of a Portuguese force 
in the front lines, with reinforcements close at hand. He did, however, admit without any 
further elaboration that distrust of some Portuguese officers might have contributed to the 
plan. For the benefit of General Sir R.D. Whigham, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff, Barnardiston then explained that ‘the principle adopted during the Peninsular War 
has left most unpleasant memories in Portugal’; according to Norton de Matos, reproduc-
ing such a step would lead to ‘violent opposition’. The timing, finally, could not be worse, 
since ‘the centenary of the so-called ‘martyrdom’ of Portuguese ‘patriot’, General Gomes 
Freire de Andrade, who was executed by Beresford for conspiracy in 1817 is just about to 
be celebrated’.2 Setting Barnardiston’s questionable use of quotation marks aside, the matter 
was indeed delicate. William Carr Beresford, the Anglo-Irish commander of the Portuguese 
army during and after the Peninsular War, had acted in his capacity as leader of the Regency 
governing Portugal in the wake of the Napoleonic wars; General Freire de Andrade, for his 
part, had plotted to overthrow that very Regency, establish a liberal regime, and demand 
the return to Portugal of the country’s King, John VI, in Brazil since 1808.
What is more, Freire de Andrade, a celebrated officer, had been one of the commanders 
of the Portuguese Legion, a military unit integrated into Napoleon’s Grande Armée and 
therefore serving his country’s (and Britain’s) enemy. Its men were very much on Norton de 
Matos’ mind when, on 1 October, he replied to Derby’s letter. He rejected all of the latter’s 
proposals, ‘with the rude frankness of a soldier’.3 Any alteration to the Convention between 
the two countries governing the existence of the C.E.P. would deeply wound national sen-
timent; everyone understood and appreciated the instruction received from, as well as the 
example set by, British officers, but Portugal could go no further in accommodating British 
wishes. Norton de Matos then informed Derby that Portuguese soldiers could cope with 
winter temperatures; they had, after all, been singled out by Napoleon as an example to 
the rest of the Grande Armée during the retreat from Moscow – a not very subtle reminder 
that there was more to Portugal’s military tradition than cooperation with Britain. What to 
the British Army was a clear lesson derived from its previous large-scale campaign on the 
continent, to the Portuguese – especially the republicans now in power – was a source of 
shame, a reminder of their country’s historical decline. Less than three weeks after writing 
this letter, at a moment when both the President of the Republic, Bernardino Machado, 
and the Prime Minister, Afonso Costa, were visiting the front lines in France, Norton de 
Matos led the Freire de Andrade centenary celebrations in the town of Oeiras. Three other 
ministers were present, as were a deputation from Lisbon’s municipal chamber, delegations 
from all the military units in the Lisbon garrison, police forces, and local schools; according 
to the press, only the incessant rain kept a larger crowd away. A military band played the 
national anthem as Norton de Matos unveiled a plaque in the already existing monument 
to Freire de Andrade, which read, ‘To Gomes Freire de Andrade. First centenary of this 
death, 18-10-1917. A homage by the Portuguese people’.4
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This short exchange between Derby and Norton de Matos suggests that relations between 
the British and Portuguese armies were tense; in reality, they were considerably worse than 
that, even if not all concerned realized this. The aim of this article is to consider the evolution 
of the relations between the two army’s commands, which at times were frankly poor and 
which led to some very questionable decisions being taken. These decisions resulted in a 
paradoxical situation: while the British High Command considered the C.E.P. a weak point 
in its lines, which it would have preferred to remove, its actions served only to weaken the 
formation even as it remained in place. Combined with changing circumstances in Portugal, 
British actions made the C.E.P.’s long-term survival as a fighting force close to impossible.5
Derby’s letter was written on the basis of a much harsher document produced some days 
earlier by Sir Douglas Haig.6 As far as Haig was concerned, it was simply unacceptable to 
hand over a whole army corps front to the C.E.P.: a single division was already proving to 
be the source of constant worry, and casualties would naturally increase in the winter. The 
ideal outcome was for all the Portuguese to go home, or to some other battlefield; but should 
political considerations render this impossible, then, Haig explained, it was time to apply 
the lessons of the Peninsular War: British officers should take charge of the troops’ training 
and of their combat operations. The soldiers were salvageable, but the officers were not; the 
time had come to admit this fact and act accordingly. And if this too proved impossible to 
enforce for political reasons, then at the very least only one division should be at the front 
with the other in the rear, in accordance with the scheme later proposed by Derby:
I desire to make it clear however that, even under such a system, the security of any portion of 
the line held by these troops must always cause grave misgiving and the consequences might 
be serious if they were attacked and gave way.
Haig’s suggestions were themselves borrowed from recent reports drawn up by Generals Sir 
Henry Horne, commander of the British First Army, and Sir Richard Haking, commander 
of XI Army Corps, comprised in part of the Portuguese First Division. Haking’s extensive 
document dated from mid-August. In it he expressed his concern over the limited influence 
British officers enjoyed over the C.E.P., contact having been limited to a short period in the 
trenches under British supervision. Wise advice had since been ignored,
with the result that the troops themselves have received a sort of veneer of instruction, which 
has been poured over them and is likely to wear off, but they have never been properly nour-
ished and built up with it.7
Hence, Haking went on, the First Division had been kept under a tight lead. There had been 
improvements, notably regarding the maintenance of defensive positions, but these had 
only come about thanks to his own constant and direct intervention. This required weekly 
meetings with Tamagnini, General Gomes da Costa (commander of the First Division) and 
brigade commanders, examining their activity in detail – but the Portuguese had revealed 
themselves to be masters in the art of dodging responsibility for their errors. The conse-
quences were felt in all aspects of the C.E.P.’s life, not least the troops’ morale. If attacked, 
the First Division would give way; that was Haking’s estimation.
The issue of poor morale was especially troubling for Haking, who ascribed it to many dif-
ferent causes: the opinion, voiced so often that it had become an axiom, that the Portuguese 
Army was not suited for trench warfare, (a ploy, he believed, to avoid taking responsibility 
for mistakes, but also to eschew the preservation of an offensive spirit through regular 
raids against enemy positions); ignorance – real or feigned – of the reasons for Portugal’s 
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belligerence and the C.E.P.’s presence in France; the political situation in Portugal, which 
generated friction and generated pointless arguments which in turn contributed nothing 
to the defeat of the enemy; and constant clashes with French civilians, used to dealing with 
the better-off British soldiers:
They have no money to spend, they are dirty in their habits, they are not above stealing things 
out of the fields, and their attitude towards the women is not always correct. They have one 
good point, they very rarely get drunk.
Morale was further depressed by the approaching winter, during which many soldiers 
expected to die of exposure. The C.E.P.’s administrative and logistical shortcomings meant 
that its food was poor, as were its uniforms. Soldiers also complained of their British-style 
rations, heavy on meat, cheese, and pickles: ‘They want to fill their stomach every day 
with vegetables as they do at home.’ The solution was to suspend parts of the Convention 
governing relations between the two armies, allowing British officers to take command of 
all the training centres in France where Portuguese soldiers made the transition to trench 
warfare. Portuguese soldiers were ‘not at all bad’, and deserved better officers; this was one 
way of providing them.
Tellingly, Haking also requested the removal of Major Roberto Baptista, the C.E.P.’s Chief 
of Staff, who seemed to belong to a ‘secret political society’; this step would strengthen the 
hand of both Tamagnini and Gomes da Costa, with whom Haking found he could work. It 
was thanks to Baptista’s misinformation, Haking believed, that politicians in Lisbon had a 
false impression of the C.E.P. and its merits (in this he was right, see below). Lastly, Haking 
suggested that the recently arrived Second Division be used as a depot for the First, whose 
integration into a British army corps would be made permanent. Curiously, Haking’s report 
was not the origin of this idea. In a letter addressed simply to Mackenzie,8 the author, 
most probably Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Ker, head of the British Mission to the C.E.P., 
explained that he was passing on the views of General Gomes da Costa, and asking to have 
these relayed to XI Corps. Gomes da Costa was worried by the lack of reserves within his 
formation; 80 officers, 400 NCOs and 1500 soldiers had still to arrive – but now there was 
talk of a Second Division, before the First had been completed. He had informed Tamagnini 
that, in his opinion, Lisbon would never send enough men and officers to keep two divisions 
in the front lines, as a result of which the Second Division should be cannibalized in order 
to keep up the First’s strength, serving only as a training force. The plan naturally did not 
please Tamagnini, who understood it as part of a strategy to deny him the command he 
had been so patiently awaiting. This document’s importance lies in the similarity it reveals 
between the points of view of the British High Command and General Gomes da Costa, 
who in British eyes was the C.E.P.’s most talented senior officer. The letter’s contents were 
confirmed by Tamagnini, who wrote, in a diary entry dated 8 August,
I concluded from what has been happening and by reading between the lines of my conference 
with Freiria [Chief of Staff of the 1st Division]: 1) that Gomes da Costa wanted, under the 
pretext of needing reinforcements, to absorb the 2nd Division, which I have always opposed, 
because otherwise the Corps would never be formed […] 2) that since he did not get his way, 
despite writing various notes on the subject, he reached out to the Commander of XI Corps 
to help him; 3) he thought that if we had only one division, he would be left in charge. I was 
very saddened by these conclusions, because they reveal what happens to those gripped by 
ambition and deviousness.9
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A week after receiving Haking’s report, Horne summarized it for Haig’s benefit.10 Horne 
showed himself to be in complete agreement with Haking. The creation of a Portuguese army 
corps, responsible for a long stretch of the front, would be a mistake; so too would be keep-
ing the Portuguese in the front lines during the winter. Out of respect for Portugal’s – and 
Tamagnini’s – dignity, Horne now repeated the suggestion that the Second Division become 
a training force, its brigades being used to allow the First Division’s fourth brigades to rest.
These reports, travelling up the military hierarchy from Haking to Derby, were produced 
at a crucial moment in the C.E.P.’s history, when it was about to be transformed from an 
ungainly formation – an infantry division11 with supporting units answerable both to the 
British army corps to which it belonged and to its own corps command – into a full-blown 
army corps. For the Portuguese Government, this was an essential step, desirous as it was 
of establishing, for domestic and international consumption, a Portuguese sector on the 
Western Front that might be presented as the notional equivalent – even if much smaller 
– of the British and French sectors.12 This, of course, was nothing short of a hoax, since 
even an army corps would be dependent on a larger formation (in this case Horne’s First 
Army) and the C.E.P. was completely reliant on the British Army for almost all of its sup-
plies (the exceptions being wine and coffee, which the Portuguese Government had agreed 
to supply). It was also dependent – and this was its Achilles’ heel – on British shipping for 
the transportation of troops from Portugal to France, be it as part of an expansion of the 
force, be it as part of its normal reinforcement.13 But for the British generals responsible 
for the collaboration with the Portuguese, this was simply unacceptable, for reasons we 
will examine below.
That a Second Division was in the offing was not a surprise. Even before the First left Lisbon 
Barnardiston had already been asked by London if another was to follow.14 Barnardiston’s 
reply, delayed as a result of a significant coup attempt launched on 13 December 1916, was 
equivocal: ‘It depends on a great many things […] it may be that having sent one large 
division to the Front people may think that they have done enough’; in any case, keeping 
up the initial force’s strength would require monthly reinforcements of some 3–4000 sol-
diers per month, a considerable burden for Portugal.15 The origins of the actual decision to 
transform the C.E.P. into an army corps are not very clear. In his recently published mem-
oirs, Tamagnini noted that it was almost an afterthought. Early in February 1917, before 
his departure to France, at a meeting in the presence of the C.E.P.’s Chief of Staff and its 
artillery commander, in the Ministry of War, it was stated that the British would welcome 
the inclusion of heavy artillery in the C.E.P. Since a lone division did not require heavy 
artillery, the decision was taken to up the expeditionary force to two divisions, in order to 
justify the despatch of heavy artillery as well.16 But João Chagas, Portugal’s minister at Paris, 
noted in his diary that Baptista had set off for Lisbon in advance of this meeting with every 
intention of raising the issue of the army corps, since ‘the support of one division is not 
sufficient to give Portugal an independent situation and worthwhile position’. And Norton 
de Matos would claim in February 1917 to have ‘studied carefully the military, economic 
and financial possibilities of the country’, as a result of which he had concluded that Portugal 
could afford to send immediately two divisions, in order to form an army corps.17 Events 
gathered pace, so that the War Office informed Haig, on 6 March, that an arrangement had 
been entered into with the Portuguese Government for this expansion. The transformation 
would be carried out by sending two groups of 75 mm guns, 1 medium trench mortar bat-
tery, 10 batteries of heavy and siege artillery and 6 infantry battalions – 12,000 officers and 
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men in total. Monthly reinforcements would be increased to 5000 per month, and it was 
hoped that the embarkation of these supplementary troops would occur seamlessly after 
the despatch of the First Division.18
On 3 April, however, Haig was informed that the British Government had declared itself 
unable to provide the shipping necessary to transport the additional forces required for the 
C.E.P.’s transformation to an army corps.19 There is no extant proof of that the Admiralty was 
responding to the High Command’s concerns in this decision; in fact, Barnardiston had on 
occasion complained to the Portuguese Government about the under-utilization of the ships 
supplied by the Admiralty for the transport of troops. Just on 29 March, Barnardiston had 
informed Norton de Matos that the convoy of four ships which had departed a week earlier 
could have transported nearly 1500 men more, had the organization on the Portuguese side 
not been deficient.20 This suggests the possibility of the hard-pressed Admiralty going on 
a solo run in relation to the C.E.P. The Portuguese reaction to the withdrawal of the ships 
was immediate, with contact at the highest levels leading to a discussion of the matter at 
Cabinet level in London:
The Portuguese Minister for War has pointed out that his proposal to convert the Expeditionary 
Force into an army corps had been fully discussed with General Barnardiston, and that to 
suspend the operation now would create material losses and a bad moral effect. The additional 
transport required involves only two extra voyages of the ships now employed.21
This might have been true in terms of constituting the Second Division, but not in terms of 
reinforcements. For Afonso Costa, recently appointed prime minister, one possible culprit 
for this decision was Jan Smuts, who had left East Africa to take up a seat in the British War 
Cabinet, and who had not been impressed by the Portuguese military performance in the 
colonies. In any case it was important to resolve this issue, and so Norton de Matos was 
despatched to London.22 Along the way he met Haig, who thought him ‘quite an energetic 
and keen little man’ and pressed him to dismiss Baptista, identified in countless reports as 
the source of the delays that plagued the C.E.P.’s preparation.23 Norton de Matos did not 
remove this officer (in fact he brought him to London), who played a crucial role in ensur-
ing respect for the Convention as part of a wider struggle to ensure respect for Portuguese 
prerogatives. On 22 May a first meeting between the two delegations took place at the War 
Office; the British were led by Lord Robert Cecil, Parliamentary Under Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, and Sir John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord. Cecil claimed that it would be difficult to find 
the merchant ships needed to satisfy Portuguese wishes; Jellicoe, for his part, promised to 
try to find two destroyers to escort them, adding that it would be impossible to provide any 
more. Barnardiston, who was present, noted of the Portuguese that they ‘were of course 
far from satisfied and evidently did not intend to let the matter rest there, but the Minister 
[Teixeira Gomes] said to M. de Matos afterwards that he had known negotiations terminate 
successfully which had begun with less prospects of success.’24
After this meeting, a long pause ensued, Norton de Matos awaiting a definitive response 
from his interlocutors. The matter was discussed at the War Cabinet on 31 May, Derby 
suggesting that Norton de Matos’ desire to meet David Lloyd George be exploited in order 
to secure permission for the British to recruit 20,000 carriers in Mozambique, to which the 
Portuguese had so far been opposed.25 On 2 June, Norton de Matos’ situation was discussed 
by the Portuguese cabinet. An impasse had developed; since the Portuguese did not seem 
willing to place more ex-German ships at London’s disposal, the British did not appear 
willing to provide the vessels needed by the C.E.P.26 War Cabinet minutes reveal that while 
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the Chief of the Imperial General Staff [C.I.G.S.], Sir William Robertson, was favourable to 
Portuguese pretensions, the Admiralty was not.27 This is remarkable since, from France, Haig 
had weighed into the debate, explaining to Derby, on 15 May, that the progress made by the 
Portuguese as a fighting force had been ‘unduly slow’; that as a division they could only be 
entrusted with a very quiet sector and even then be kept under ‘constant supervision’; that 
Portuguese officers ‘regarded our army as composed mainly of amateurs from whom they 
had nothing to learn except a few details of trench warfare’; and that, as a result, he recom-
mended ‘that no additional troops be dispatched from Portugal beyond the requirements 
necessary for the maintenance of the one division now being organised in this country’.28 
Haig backed up this assessment with a summary of the C.E.P.’s training, drawn up by Horne 
on 4 May.29 Not entirely damning, the report nevertheless stated that ‘the men are sturdy, 
quick and willing to learn. Their relations with our men are most cordial. The root of all 
their inefficiency is the inexperience and incompetence of many of the officers’. Despite this 
report, Sir William Robertson’s advice carried the day, the War Cabinet requesting Jellicoe 
‘to arrange with the Shipping Controller for the loan of two British transports to convey 
the remainder of the second Portuguese division to Brest’.
Barnardiston seems to have been of some help to the Portuguese, arguing with his inter-
locutors that London had acted in bad faith by breaking off the provision of shipping for the 
C.E.P., which ultimately made it impossible for the Portuguese to remain on the battlefield. 
In his diary he added,
I also thought that we were bound to do what we could to prevent the grave difficulties in 
which the Portuguese Government, as our oldest ally, would find itself in should we persist 
in our attitude.
According to Barnardiston, it was his memo to Sir William Robertson that resolved the 
situation.30 Norton de Matos also seems to have promised the British that the C.E.P. would 
not want for officers, as had been the case hitherto; this much is clear from a number of 
communications sent to Afonso Costa in Lisbon stating that the hurried production of 
officers was essential in order to secure a British agreement.31 Informed of the British deci-
sion in 16 June, Norton de Matos forcefully requested that the two ships and their escorts be 
kept on in Portuguese service into the future, in order to ensure the normal reinforcement 
of the C.E.P.32 A partially positive reply to this request was sent only on 17 July, signed by 
Sir Walter Langley for the Foreign Secretary, stating that the Inventor and the Bellerophon 
would help to transport the Second Division, after which the Inventor would be withdrawn: 
‘This latter vessel will provide for all the monthly reinforcements of animals and for half 
the monthly reinforcements of troops’. It would be up to the Portuguese to make up the 
shortfall.33 By this stage complaints about the poor employment made of the ships had 
begun again, Barnardiston warning that ‘failure to use them to their utmost capacity and 
to adhere to the required programme might cause the Admiralty to be unwilling to con-
tinue to provide shipping’.34 By this stage as well, Sir Douglas Haig had again intervened in 
the debate on the fate of the Portuguese, reminding Derby of his letter of 15 May, quoted 
above, and adding that ‘nothing has since occurred to me to change this position.’35 Should 
it prove impossible to prevent this, then, in order to preserve precious equipment, including 
artillery, and horses, the C.E.P. should be ‘organized and equipped on a defensive basis, and 
be allotted sufficient transport to meet the requirements of trench warfare only’.
Away from the world’s attention, the First Division continued its preparation to move 
up to the trenches as a unit. On 19 June, after a long silence on the issue, Afonso Costa 
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informed Parliament of the progress made by the C.E.P., reading out a telegram received 
from France. The day was coming, Costa explained, when the whole division took up its 
place in the front lines. Thus far a number of German raids had been carried out against 
Portuguese positions; these had been repulsed and morale was good. According to the 
prime minister, the C.E.P. had so far suffered 34 mortal casualties, including 2 officers, 185 
wounded, and 15 missing in action.36 News of Portuguese forces in action was of extreme 
importance to the government, given the desire to use the war to convey a positive image 
of the country and the Republic. As far away as Honolulu, Portuguese-language newspapers 
celebrated the C.E.P.’s baptism of fire.37
On 6 July Norton de Matos, following his return from London, addressed Parliament on 
the subject of the nature and the dimension of Portugal’s war effort. The constant departure 
of troops was the cause of great worry across the country, and even in the ruling Democratic 
party’s parliamentary group, but the Minister’s words, instead of calming the situation, 
poured petrol on the flames. According to Norton de Matos, a decision had been taken 
to limit the Portuguese presence on the Western Front to an army corps, although the 
country could have made a greater commitment. Still, he added, an average of 4000 men 
would have to be sent to France every month to cover the expected losses. This came as 
news to Portuguese observers and meant, in essence, that in the space of a year, should the 
war last that long (and there was no sign that it would not), the equivalent of the C.E.P.’s 
fighting units would have been replaced due to enemy action. Norton de Matos’ speech led 
directly to the holding of secret sessions of parliament; these revealed concerns about the 
war materiel taken by the C.E.P. to France, and later replaced by British-issue weapons,38 the 
allegedly poor quality of the C.E.P.’s medical services, and the existence of shirkers within the 
C.E.P. – officers who succeeded in staying well away from the battle areas, safe in the rear.39 
Norton de Matos, under fire, initially agreed to a parliamentary inquiry into the ‘Portuguese 
military services’ in France40 – about which nothing was ever heard of again – but the very 
next day stated that the impressions he had collected while in France were very positive. As 
a result, the Minister of War expressed surprise at the way in which only the C.E.P.’s faults 
were brought before the parliament, and never ‘all the good things that exist in this army 
corps, an army corps that does not belong to the Government, but rather to the nation’.41
On 25 June Norton de Matos, returning from London, wrote a long letter to Tamagnini, 
who summarized it in his memoirs:
Referring to the conference with Marshal Douglas Haig and to the latter’s statement that we 
were very slow, he recommends that we work hard to undo the bad impression which had for 
so long now attached itself to us, and which many recent events had strengthened.42
Norton de Matos also urged Tamagnini to produce officers out of the soldiers and sergeants 
already in the C.E.P. and admitted the existence of faults in the unit:
I arrived with the sensation that not enough work was being done, that many officers were 
disinterested, that many of them still see the honourable mission with which they were tasked as 
a form of exile, as a punishment which will come to an end once the men who wanted the war, 
as they put it, have also disappeared […] There is no doubt that the great majority of officers 
are not good; but we have a splendid minority of great officers, and, as always, it will be the 
minority with its admirable qualities who will triumph over the majority with its bad defects.43
Good and bad officers, dedicated and negligent officers, trustworthy and hostile officers: 
This was how Norton de Matos viewed the C.E.P., the unit which he had created and sent 
to France, entrusting it with Portugal’s reputation and even its future. It is clear that within 
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the C.E.P. political rivalries were intense. The Army’s republican officers, in a clear minor-
ity, found themselves more isolated and exposed to their peers’ hostility once in France, 
but relied for protection on a direct connection to the governing class in Portugal. Many 
such officers were to be found in the C.E.P.’s Staff, led by Baptista; important in this regard 
as well were the parliamentary deputies at the front. These attempted to organize a dinner 
in honour of Norton de Matos, when the latter passed through on his way to London; 
Tamagnini prevented this event from going ahead.44 But it proved impossible to prevent 
a similar gathering during the October 1917 presidential visit to the front lines, during 
which Afonso Costa himself organized a lunch attended exclusively by politicians.45 Like 
Baptista, these parliamentarians had developed a great aversion for Tamagnini who, they 
thought, was simply doing the bidding of the British High Command. They asked for his 
replacement, Tamagnini explained in his memoirs. One of them, Barbosa de Magalhães, 
informed Afonso Costa on 18 September that
On one side are all the Staff officers and our friends, like Sá Cardoso and Pope, who are aware 
of the situation.
On the other side are only the two generals, Tamagnini and Gomes da Costa (I won’t mention 
Simas Machado [Commander of the 2nd Division] because he counts for nothing … suffices 
for me to tell you that he goes to mass every day – I’m not exaggerating, it’s the truth – for you 
to get a sense of what he is worth).
What separated the two groups? Simply put, relations with the British:
[…] the two generals (each for his own reasons) have been carrying out the policy of the 
English, who pointed out to them that they were being too considerate to the Staff officers, 
i.e. those who stood in their way of that policy. In this way, through kindness, Tamagnini’s 
foolishness and Gomes da Costa’s ambition, the English now have the two generals, especially 
Tamagnini, saying amen to whatever they want, and not standing up to the resistance offered 
by the British to the complete organization of our C.E.P., and accepting what is, for us, a true 
humiliation.46
According to Tamagnini, this statement was ‘simply idiotic’. But intelligence reports noted 
how real these divisions were,47 while other letters were written along these lines to Norton 
de Matos and Afonso Costa by the republican politicians now fighting in France. Sá Cardoso, 
a former President of the Chamber of Deputies, denounced British interference in the life 
of the C.E.P., notably its training. Tamagnini explained the incident behind this accusation, 
which illustrated vividly the clash of cultures between the two forces. Haking, while visit-
ing the Portuguese training camp at Marthes, observed a junior officer in the Engineering 
Corps making a mistake during a trench-building exercise: the trench being built faced 
the wrong way, given the terrain. Haking intervened, showing the young officer the nature 
of the mistake:
And then he took him by the arm and walked half a dozen steps towards the incline. Pointing 
downwards, he gave some pointers in his bad French.
The camp commander felt slighted by the sudden appearance of a British general giving passing 
judgement before the School which he headed, and tendered his resignation.48
Asked not to repeat his visit, Haking had explained that he had not entertained ‘the slightest 
intention of offending the young officer, rather wishing to offer him a proof of familiarity’. 
This seemingly innocuous incident would still be referred by Afonso Costa when he again 
visited the C.E.P. in November 1917.49
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Throughout the summer, Haking and the British Mission to the C.E.P. kept the 
Portuguese division under constant vigilance. On 11 July, for example, Haking passed on 
to the Portuguese the results of the latest inspections by XI Corps staff officers. Their big-
gest worry was the lack of concern displayed by the Portuguese with the state of their wire 
defences, often left unrepaired for more than 24 h. Too much time elapsed before sandbag 
defences were repaired and made bullet-proof, and maintenance was carried out in the 
trench system. Some posts were left sentry-less; munitions were stored without due care, 
being left exposed to the rain. Litter was another problem, as well as the lack of hygiene 
in the kitchens. Finally, in the rear, training was insufficient.50 On 18 August Ker, wrote to 
Roberto Baptista after a visit to the First Division alongside Brigadier-General Studd;51 this 
officer had asked to pass on a few messages: the fire-steps in this part of the line required 
repairs; greater care was needed with British soldiers on official business in the Portuguese 
sector, who were not being properly fed; badly stored munitions were exposed to the ele-
ments; the cleanliness of the trenches had improved, but not that of the kitchens; the wire 
was in a poor state in a number of locations; and outside the front line itself disarmed sol-
diers could often be observed. These British concerns were not known in Portugal; all the 
news reproduced in the press was good. On 29 August, newspapers relayed a message by 
Tamagnini which detailed a failed German raid. This action had resulted in the capture of 
three prisoners, various clashes in no-man’s land, and artillery duels; morale, the message 
stated, remained excellent.52
By the late summer of 1917, then, the transportation of the C.E.P.’s Second Division, 
while still problematic, was continuing apace, and the expectation in Lisbon was that the 
army corps would be established with little delay and quickly take to the trenches as a 
whole. As we have seen, Haig tried to derail this process, on the basis of reports which 
reached him from below. Derby conveyed Haig’s concern to Norton de Matos, who swept 
it aside. Barnardiston passed on Norton de Matos’ reply to Derby, adding a letter of his own 
to the C.I.G.S. in which he noted what was clear for everyone to see – that there were ‘no 
doubt stronger reasons for the importance attached to Lord Derby’s proposal’ than those 
mentioned in the letter.53 Barnardiston explained that while the Portuguese would never 
agree to the insertion of British officers in the C.E.P., it might be possible ‘to arrange that 
not more than one Portuguese division should be in the line at a time, with the other in 
reserve, so long as they formed the one corps’. And Barnardiston pleaded for patience with 
the Portuguese – ‘we are apt sometimes to set almost too high a standard in comparing 
foreign armies with our own’ – given the political investment which the C.E.P. represented:
The almost inevitable results of the break-up of the army corps in France will be the upset of the 
Government, the loss of the services of the War Minister, an impetus to anti-war propaganda 
and the hostility of Portugal.
In October, President Bernardino Machado undertook a tour of the Western Front, 
engaging in meetings with Allied dignitaries. Some in British circles saw this as a last 
chance to work out a realistic deal with the Portuguese over the use of the C.E.P.54 In real-
ity, though, as Barnardiston’s diary suggests, the contacts were counterproductive. After 
his return from France Bernardino Machado spoke with Barnardiston on 3 November, 
during a diplomatic reception. A jubilant Machado had bragged that the Portuguese had 
made no-man’s land their own, and it was now commonly referred to as ‘Portuguese land’. 
Barnardiston despaired: ‘It seems to me to be a mistake to put the butter on as thick as 
this’. How could Derby’s proposals, he wondered, make any headway when words such as 
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these were spoken before the Portuguese?55 This month saw two serious blows delivered to 
the C.E.P., one expected, the other not. On the 11th, Barnardiston was informed that the 
Inventor had been removed from Portuguese service; and then, on the 27th, the Bellerophon 
was also taken away.56 Portugal was now left without any major transport ship capable of 
sending reinforcements and supplies to the C.E.P. But it was precisely in the wake of this 
last decision that the C.E.P. was formally constituted as a fighting army corps, and that 
the Second Division, its adaptation complete, joined the First in the trenches. As winter 
approached – the winter everyone seemed to expect would see an increase in casualties, 
even without German intervention – the C.E.P. faced the defence of a long sector of the 
front line without a steady supply of reinforcements. A week before the Bellerophon was 
reassigned, Ker had written a long letter to Barnardiston, bringing him up to date on the 
situation with the Portuguese. The First Division was improving in terms of ‘discipline and 
morale’, thanks to the efforts of Gomes da Costa – ‘a tower of strength’ – and Tamagnini: 
‘but staffs are vile, and subordinate commanders very poor’; amongst these there was not 
‘the faintest inclination to look after their men’. Sanitation was a constant problem, although 
improving; thefts from the local population and clashes with B.E.F. troops – especially the 
Australians57 – were another headache. A third was the lack, or ineffectiveness, of raids 
on German trenches. It was absolutely necessary to provide the C.E.P. with hundreds of 
dedicated young officers. The situation was worse in the Second Division, while political 
intrigue remained an enormous obstacle: this was Ker’s major concern. As he put it, ‘some 
of the human obstacles must be sacrificed if the Portuguese army is to do credit to Portugal, 
and if Portugal is to derive the best results from the war’.58
It was at this time that Barnardiston was visited in Lisbon by Lieutenant Bleck, a young 
British officer who, because regularly resident in Lisbon, and fluent in Portuguese, had been 
entrusted with liaison tasks in the C.E.P.’s H.Q. Bleck’s testimony is extremely interesting, 
since he naturally desired to see the greatest possible cooperation between, and respect 
among, the two armies. There were others like him, the scions of British trading families 
long established in Portugal. Bleck’s account, as transcribed by Barnardiston in his diary, 
was not encouraging:
Tamagnini is not supported either by his Chief of the Staff Baptista, or his divisional command-
ers in the way he should be. Gomes da Costa is a good soldier but seems to think he knows 
better than Tamagnini and is not always ready to comply with orders. Simas Machado does 
not work well with his corps commander.59
The picture painted of the units in the trenches was equally troubling:
There is a spirit of opposition to everything asked for by the British, & feeling on the part of 
the Portuguese that we interfere. They think their organisation is better than ours & are so 
conceited they will not improve themselves. Regimental officers care nothing for their men 
and the men have no respect for their officers and do not regard them as their leaders.
There was also little will to carry out raids against the German trenches. For the Portuguese, 
it seemed, the strict defence of their positions was sufficient reason to justify – and even to 
celebrate – their presence in France.
In his memoirs, Tamagnini noted the timeline of the army corps’ establishment. By 15 
August the units of the Second Division had been assembled in France, some companies 
having begun their initial stints in the British trenches as early as 18 June. In August they 
had begun to be sent up as battalions; on 5 November a Portuguese sector was formally 
constituted, and on 26 November the Second Division as a whole moved alongside the 
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First; this step was preceded by numerous meetings with the British military authorities.60 
For Tamagnini, this was a moment of supreme satisfaction, as he made clear: ‘To oppose its 
organization would be to display lack of pride and dignity, and to betray the trust depos-
ited in me by the Republic’s government, which had appointed me’.61 The creation of a 
Portuguese sector saw Tamagnini writing Horne, expressing the hope that ‘the good feeling 
and friendship between the Armies of our two countries which has always existed when 
they have fought shoulder to shoulder for the same cause, may be renewed and intensified’.62 
What no-one, on either side, seemed to reflect on, was the probable impact of the lack of 
reinforcements on the C.E.P. Only Barnardiston, to his credit, wrote, on 8 November – 
when informed that the British naval transport officer hitherto stationed in Lisbon was 
being recalled – that ‘I earnestly hope this does not indicate non-fulfilment of agreement 
of Portuguese Government by entire stoppage of means of transport and that conveyance 
of reinforcement will recommence as soon as circumstances permit’.63 There was more than 
a touch of the absurd about this situation. While on the one hand the C.E.P.’s dependence 
on the much larger British army had not come to an end, on the other the permanence of 
the whole corps in the trenches would naturally result in higher casualties, even without 
a full assault by the Germans opposite. On the British side, there may well have been the 
desire to force the Portuguese to accept the Derby plan (although there is no surviving 
evidence of joint action in this regard by the High Command in France and the Admiralty) 
by sheer force of casualties. On the Portuguese side the situation was equally complex. For 
Tamagnini to refuse the constitution of the army corps would have cost him his position 
and reputation; for the government, desirous above all else to create facts that might be 
used to enhance the regime’s reputation, the best that might be said is that it hoped to place 
the Allies under greater moral pressure, using the C.E.P.’s growing manpower difficulties to 
re-establish the maritime link between Lisbon and Brest.
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